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In this article, I undertake the tasks: (i) of reconsidering Feigl’s notion of a ‘nomological
dangler’ in light of recent discussion about the viability of accommodating phenomenal
properties, or qualia, within a physicalist picture of reality; and (ii) of constructing an
argument to the effect that nomological danglers, including the way qualia are under-
stood to be related to brain states by contemporary dualists, are extremely unlikely.
I offer a probabilistic argument to the effect that merely nomological danglers are
extremely unlikely, the only probabilistically coherent candidates being ‘anomic
danglers’ (not even nomically correlated) and ‘necessary danglers’ (more than merely
nomically correlated). After I show, based on similar probabilistic reasoning, that the
first disjunct (anomic danglers) is very unlikely, I conclude that the identity thesis is the
only remaining candidate for the mental–physical connection. The novelty of the argu-
ment is that it brings probabilistic considerations in favor of physicalism, a move that has
been neglected in the recent burgeoning literature on the subject.
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The mind–brain identity thesis starts its career—setting aside temporally prior
and argumentatively and conceptually frugal assertions in that direction
by various philosophers and scientists—in the second half of the 1950s, with
the work of Ullin Place ([1956]), Herbert Feigl ([1958/1967]), and Jack Smart
([1959]). From today’s perspective, Feigl’s study, ‘The “Mental” and the
“Physical” ’, is the most remarkable of the three loci classici mentioned
above in that it is wide ranging, both theoretically and historically, and
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seminal in more than one respect; one can identify in it a large set of topics that
are widely discussed today in the philosophy of mind: intentionality, qualia,
neural correlates of consciousness, multiple realizability, mental causation,
weak and strong reduction, etc.
In this article I undertake the task of reconsidering Feigl’s notion of a
‘nomological dangler’ in light of recent discussion about the viability of
accommodating phenomenal properties, or qualia, within a physicalist picture
of reality. I will construct an argument to the effect that nomological danglers,
including the way qualia are understood to be related to brain states by con-
temporary dualists, are extremely unlikely. The final step of the argument, the
one to the likelihood of the identity thesis, will partially overlap with Feigl’s
main reason, namely, parsimony, or Ockham’s razor. However, unlike Feigl,
and those who discussed his idea of nomological danglers, I emphasize that
the problems with naturalistic (nomological) dualism are not in the first in-
stance with the ‘dangling’ bit, but with the ‘nomological’ bit. I will start with a
very brief review of Feigl’s above-mentioned notion and the role it plays in his
argument for the identity thesis, after which I briefly review the post-Feigl
dialectic regarding physicalism and dualism. Then I offer a probabilistic
argument to the effect that merely nomological danglers are extremely unlike-
ly, the only probabilistically coherent candidates being ‘anomic danglers’
(not even nomically correlated) and ‘necessary danglers’ (more than merely
nomically correlated). After I show, based on similar probabilistic reasoning,
that the first disjunct (anomic danglers) is very unlikely, I conclude, by the
above-mentioned principle of parsimony and two other plausible principles,
that the identity thesis is the only extremely likely candidate for the mental–
physical connection. The novelty of the argument is that it brings probabilistic
considerations in favor of physicalism, a move that has been neglected in the
recent mushrooming literature on the subject.
1 The Notion of a Nomological Dangler
Feigl’s main objective is to defend the coherence and plausibility of the mind–
brain empirical identification thesis, put forward earlier by U.T. Place.1
He starts by arguing that mental–physical parallelism, i.e. the existence of
laws of correlation between mental and physical events or properties, is su-
perior to interactionist dualism. Parallelism is simply the view that there is a
law-like connection between the two domains, the mental and the physical, so
1 As David Armstrong notes (personal communication) ‘it was Place who started it all, but un-
fortunately he published his idea in the wrong place’. The identity thesis then starts its real career
with J.J.C. Smart’s article, published in 1959, and culminates with Armstrong’s ([1968]) and
David Lewis’s ([1966], [1970], [1972]) functionalist, semantics-based arguments for it.
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it is assumed to be a notion neutral between a dualist reading, in which case it
is equated with epiphenomenalism, and a physicalist one. Accepting parallel-
ism as plausible is a first step towards the identity thesis. The next step is to
observe that these laws, if irreducible, are very different from other lawful
generalizations that are present in sciences. Hence Feigl writes:
These correlation laws are utterly different from any other laws of
(physical2) science in that, first, they are nomological ‘danglers’, i.e.,
relations which connect intersubjectively confirmable events with events
which ex hypothesi are in principle not intersubjectively and independ-
ently confirmable. Hence, the presence or absence of phenomenal data
is not a difference that could conceivably make a difference in the
confirmatory physical1-observational evidence, i.e., in the publicly
observable behavior, or for that matter in the neural processes observed
or inferred by the neurophysiologists. And second, these correlation laws
would, unlike other correlation laws in the natural sciences, be (again ex
hypothesi) absolutely underivable from the premises of even the most
inclusive and enriched set of postulates of any future theoretical physics
or biology.’ ([1958/1967], Chapter 5, Section B, p. 61)
Feigl defines two notions of the physical in Chapter 5, Section A. ‘Physical2’ is
defined as the kind of theoretical concepts and statements which are sufficient
for the explanation of the observation statements regarding the inorganic
(lifeless) domain of nature, whereas ‘physical1’ refers to the concepts and
statements used by all sciences, which involves logical or probabilistic connec-
tions to intersubjective observation language. As a matter of fact, according to
Feigl, the two domains of the physical actually coincide, which means that
there are no genuinely emergent properties.
Turning now to the notion of nomological danglers, we observe that for
Feigl it applies to certain nomic relations, and not to the relata of these rela-
tions.2 So the ‘nomological’ part of the notion refers to the fact that
psycho-physical correlations represent, indeed, some form of nomic connec-
tion. However, the ‘dangling’ part refers to the fact that, unlike other scientific
laws, psycho-physical ones are odd in that they relate the standard, publicly
observable, and intersubjectively confirmable phenomena (the brain states)
with phenomena that are ex hypothesi exclusively subjective (the raw feels,
or qualia), and hence they don’t (and can’t) make any explanatory difference
when it comes to confirmation of a hypothesis about a potential nomic
connection.3
2 Unlike for Smart ([1959], p. 142), who adopts the phrase from Feigl, but changes its meaning so
as to apply to sensations, raw feels, or qualia, which are supposed to dangle, i.e. to be onto-
logically distinct from but lawfully connected to what the complete scientific picture of the world
would encompass.
3 Cf. David Chalmers’ ([1996]), where he uses, throughout his book, the formula ‘the explanatory
irrelevance of conscious experience’ to express the same thought.
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The notion of a nomological dangler is not logically incoherent. The only
problem with it, according to both Feigl and Smart, is the ‘dangling’ bit, but
that is not a problem of logical coherence; it is rather a problem of suitability
to the naturalistic and reductionist Zeitgeist. That being said, Feigl completes
his argument for the identity thesis by arguing that once the parallelist or
correlationist thesis is accepted as plausible, considerations of ontological
parsimony and the methodological constraint of avoiding nomological dan-
glers as unnecessary make the empirical (i.e. non-analytic) identification of
mental and neurophysiological types of states the only plausible candidate for
the mind–body relation. Once the identification has been made, the way the
mental is related to the physical is no different from the way particular aspects
of the physical are related to the physical, and these nomic connections are
between relata that are intersubjectively available and confirmable.
Following the great opening due to the three above-mentioned materialist
thinkers, the empirical identity thesis was turned, in the second half of
the 1960s, in the works of David Lewis ([1966]) and David Armstrong
([1968]), into a thesis with an essential analytic component. The reason
Feigl had been afraid of analyticity in connection with the mind–body prob-
lem was that he couldn’t see, and rightly so, any prospect for synonymy be-
tween the neurophysiological and the phenomenal vocabulary. However, it
was actually Smart who first realized4 that even if there is no direct synonymy
between these vocabularies, one could formulate an analysis, or at least a gloss
on phenomenal concepts by using a so-called topic-neutral vocabulary:5
My suggestion is as follows. When a person says, ‘I see a
yellowish-orange after-image,’ he is saying something like this: ‘There
is something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes
open, am awake, and there is an orange illuminated in good light in front
of me, that is, when I really see an orange.’[. . .]. Notice that the italicized
words, namely ‘there is something going on which is like what is going on
when,’ are all quasi-logical or topic-neutral words. This explains why
the ancient Greek peasant’s reports about his sensations can be
neutral between dualistic metaphysics or my materialistic metaphysics.
(Smart [1959], pp. 149–50)
4 In fairness to Feigl, we should mention that he comes very close to the identity theory as
mediated by topic-neutral analysis, as he actually uses a two-step identification process, one
between raw feels and referents of concepts that are inferentially related to logically behavioral
concepts, and one from the latter to referents of neurophysiological concepts. At the very be-
ginning of Section E of Chapter 5 (p. 78) he writes: ‘Taking into consideration everything we
have said so far about the scientific and the philosophical aspects of the mind-body problem, the
following view suggests itself: The raw feels of direct experience as we “have” them, are empir-
ically identifiable with the referents of certain specifiable concepts of molar behavior theory, and
these in turn [. . .] are empirically identifiable with the referents of some neurophysiological
concepts.’
5 Indeed, as Colin McGinn ([2001], p. 286) points out, one finds two essentially different theories
in one and the same article by Smart under the name ‘identity theory’: what has nowadays been
called ‘a posteriori’ versus ‘a priori physicalism’ (cf. Stoljar [2000], [2001]).
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The topic-neutral analysis would later become the standard step towards the
identification of mental and neurophysiological properties in the doctrine of
analytic functionalism. First, mental terms are given an analysis in causal-role
functional terms, then the realizer of the causal role in actuality is identified as
a certain neurophysiological property. Thus, the identity thesis is argued for
in a way that does not appeal to Ockham’s razor (cf. Lewis [1966]).
The 1970s and 1980s have witnessed the emergence of a series of important
anti-physicalist arguments.6 I am not going to expound these arguments,
but rather rely on Chalmers’ approach to them and synthesize them under
the general heading of epistemic arguments. According to Chalmers ([2003],
p. 108):
The general form of an epistemic argument against materialism is as
follows:
(1) There is an epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths.
(2) If there is an epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal
truths, then there is an ontological gap, and materialism is false.
____________________________
(3) Materialism is false.
Of course this way of looking at things oversimplifies matters, and
abstracts away from the differences between the arguments. [. . .]
Nevertheless, this analysis provides a useful lens through which to
see what the arguments have in common, and through which to
analyse various responses to the arguments.
The epistemic arguments apply, of course, not only to physical properties as
such, but the topic-neutral ones that are used by analytic versions of the
identity thesis. It is argued in the first premise that the instantiation of both
physical and functional properties is epistemically compatible with the lack of
instantiation of phenomenal properties, or raw feels. Then it is inferred that
since there is no reason to doubt in this particular case that the epistemic
compatibility is a good guide to metaphysical compatibility, the correspond-
ing metaphysical compatibility claim is justified. Hence, physicalism—the
view that the totality of actually instantiated physical and functional proper-
ties metaphysically entails the instantiation of raw feels—must be false.
If these epistemic arguments are accepted as sound, then if we combine
them with Feigl’s idea that nomological danglers, though methodologically
weird, are logically coherent, we get the doctrine of naturalistic dualism as a
6 Saul Kripke’s argument against the early, empirical, and contingent identity thesis ([1972]), the
argument from the conceivability of zombies (Kirk [1974a], [1974b], and later revived and de-
veloped by Chalmers [1996]), the argument from subjectivity (Nagel [1974]—though we should
add that Nagel himself did not take his argument to actually prove the falsity of physicalism),
the argument from the explanatory gap (Levine [1983]—as in Nagel’s case, we should note that
Levine did not think his argument was incompatible with the truth of physicalism), the know-
ledge argument (Jackson [1982]).
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perfectly coherent and plausible view of the mind–body relation. According to
naturalistic dualism, the mental and the physical properties are both funda-
mental to the actual world in the sense that neither of them metaphysically
supervenes on the other. They are ontologically distinct kinds of properties.
Nevertheless the ‘naturalistic’ bit of naturalistic dualism asserts that the
two kinds of properties are nomically connected, namely, by laws of nature
whose form we can infer by extending our own case of the link between our
raw feels and functional-cum-neurophysiological properties. Finally, these
nomic connections are contingent, just like other laws of nature, according
to this doctrine. The view7 is based on the apparently unproblematic obser-
vation that there is nothing incoherent in the idea that phenomenal properties
figure in special, irreducible, and fundamental psycho-physical laws. As we
have seen, Feigl himself, although uneasy about the ‘aesthetics’ and skeptical
about the indispensability of such laws, did not think they are incoherent
as such.
This brings me to the argument I would like to put forward, to the conclu-
sion that the doctrine of naturalistic dualism is probabilistically incoherent,
and that physicalism, in the form of the identity thesis, is the likeliest candidate
for the mental–physical relation.
2 The Probabilistic Incoherence of Naturalistic Dualism
The idea of nomological danglers, as understood by Feigl, involves the idea of
asserting the existence of a nomic connection between the intersubjectively
confirmable phenomena and some phenomena that are in principle unavail-
able intersubjectively. How do we know that a certain nomic pattern holds in
the actual world, if this is so? One thing that both Feigl and recent naturalistic
dualists accept is that we can’t be sure of it, but they also agree that we can
probabilistically infer, from behavior and other intersubjectively available
evidential bases, the existence of the relata of this connection, and therefore
we can infer the existence of the supposed nomic connection. But this is too
swift. Even if we can probabilistically infer the existence of subjective raw feels
from intersubjective data and own case subjective data, that is still not enough
to infer that the correlations that hold in my own case—of the form ‘whenever
I am in intense pain, I am screaming’, etc.—hold in exactly the same way for
others. Nevertheless, suppose we do have evidence for probabilistically infer-
ring the existence of the nomic connections the way we think they are.
Let us call the psycho-physical nomic profile of the actual world that uni-
versally generalizes own case phenomenal–neurophysiological correlations in
7 Among its supporters we find Chalmers ([1995], [1996]), Tim Crane ([2001]), Galen Strawson
([1997]), Leopold Stubenberg ([1998]), and myself ([2008]).
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the relevant subjects ‘the normal nomic profile’ (NNP). If the actual world
is in NNP, then it is always the case that whenever a subject sees red, she is
disposed to assert ‘I see red’, whenever a subject feels pain, she is disposed
to manifest it behaviorally by exclaiming ‘Ouch!’, and so on and so forth. If
these are the correlation laws, then NNP is how the naturalistic dualist
conceives of the actual world. There are no spectrum-inverted pairs of
subjects, there are no zombies, etc. As I said, ex hypothesi, we can never
be sure whether others are undergoing the very same phenomenal states as
we do when the same behavioral and neurophysiological properties are
instantiated in them. We supposed that, nevertheless, we have probabilistic
justification to think that the world is in NNP. The problem with natural-
istic dualism is that the very same premise that ensures the logical coherence
of dualism, namely, the first premise of the canonical epistemic argument,
also weakens to almost null degree the probabilistic justification for the
proposition that NNP is actually the case. So if that premise is plausible,
then our probabilistic inference to NNP in the actual world is extremely
implausible or flawed.
Let me explain. The first premise of the epistemic argument asserts
that there is an epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal facts.
Translated in the form of a conceivability claim the premise would assert
that it is conceivable that there be a world that is physically exactly like the
actual world, but phenomenally different. The formula ‘phenomenally differ-
ent’ is very general, indeed, so the number of conceivable scenarios of com-
binations of phenomenal properties is, on the assumption of discreteness of
these properties and the conceivability of alien properties,8 countably infinite.
Furthermore, there is a sense in which (see Section 4 for an account of this
claim) the number of anomic scenarios will be by far greater than the number
of conceivable nomic profiles, as it will be a function of combining instanti-
ations of phenomenal properties even at the level of one particular subject,
or one particular time. Of course, the extant literature on conceivability
arguments got us conditioned on a couple of rhetorically salient cases,
true Schelling points of the logical space, namely the zombie scenario (when
everything is physically as it actually is, but there is no instantiation of any
phenomenal property whatsoever), and the inverted qualia scenario (when
everything is physically as it actually is, but color qualia instantiations are
spectrum inverted with respect to the actual world). When discussing conceiv-
ability arguments, we typically focus on these scenarios. But we shouldn’t.
They are purely rhetorical devices to make the anti-physicalist argument
8 Alien properties are defined as those that are instantiated in some possible worlds, but not in the
actual world.
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appear intuitive. If zombies and qualia inversion are conceivable, then there is
no principled reason for all the other, infinitely many scenarios not to be
conceivable. This brings us to formulating what I would call ‘the principle
of explosion’.9
(EXPLOSION) If a scenario S is conceivable, then all relevantly similar
scenarios are conceivable.
Of course, it is not always the case that we can straightforwardly find out
whether a pair of scenarios are relevantly similar, but in our case—the
psycho-physical case—the similarity is underwritten by (i) physical duplica-
tion and (ii) phenomenal difference. It is because phenomenal difference in-
volves any conceivable combination of phenomenal properties that we are
able to apply the principle to the psycho-physical case:
(PSYCHO-EXPLOSION) If a physical duplicate of actuality that is
phenomenally different in respect R is conceivable, then all physical
duplicates of actuality that are phenomenally different in any respect R*
are conceivable.
But if there are infinitely many conceivable non-NNP scenarios, most of which
are anomic, i.e. random distributions of phenomenal properties in physical
duplicates of our world, how are we to know, probabilistically, that our world
has NNP? We know from the discussion on Feigl that phenomenal properties
are not intersubjectively accessible. Similarly, Chalmers argues at length for
the explanatory irrelevance of phenomenal properties, which means that they
do not make a difference to third-person observation, and, hence, to evidential
bases for confirmation. But this means that for all we know intersubjectively,
the actual world could turn out to be in any conceivable nomic or anomic
profile. The principle of indifference, which is a rule for assigning probabilities
under ignorance, would tell us that the actual world being in NNP is equi-
probable with any of the infinite number of other conceivable scenarios.
That means that the probability of the actual world being in NNP is 1/1,
i.e. zero. However, by contraposition, since the naturalistic dualist believes
that the actual world is surely in NNP, it means that the non-NNP scenarios
(zombies, inversions, etc.) must be inconceivable—they are not present in
logical space.
9 The principle is inspired by work on impossible worlds. An instance of explosion is the ex falsum
sequitur quodlibet in standard logic, according to which one can derive any proposition from any
contradiction. It implies that, in a world where one contradiciton is true, everything is true. I
borrow the term ‘explosion’ from Daniel Nolan ([1997]) who calls a world where every prop-
osition is true an ‘explosion world’. Nolan argues against the principle of explosion, Lewis
([1988]) offers an argument for it.
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3 The Inference to Mind–Brain Identity
I would like to go further and argue for a way to reach, at this point, the step of
identifying the mental and the physical, just like the identity theory would
prescribe. There are two ways to go, both of which seem to me quite plausible.
One way is to assume naturalism in the form of accepting that the actual
world has NNP, and, consequently, to deny the disjunct stating that the actual
world is very likely to be anomic with respect to psycho-physical connections.
This would entail the inconceivability of zombies, qualia inversion, and other
abnormal scenarios, and consequently the epistemic necessity of the actual
psycho-physical nomic profile. The options we are then left with are: (i)
distinctness but necessary connection between phenomenal and physical prop-
erties; and (ii) identity.
There are three arguments against the first option. One argument is via
Hume’s dictum that there are no necessary connections between distinct
existences. Contraposing, since we have reason to think that the necessary
connection must hold, we have reasons to identify the phenomenal with the
physical. Another argument is via Ockham’s razor, which states that one
shouldn’t multiply entities beyond necessity. In other words, if one can explain
some phenomenon in various ways, one should opt for the ontologically most
parsimonious such way. Applied to our case the argument would make plaus-
ible the identity thesis in comparison to the less parsimonious alternative
based on necessary connections between distinct kinds of properties, given
that both options have exactly the same explanatory status and make the
same predictions. Finally, the third argument is from the principle of no
brute, unexplained necessity, which states that postulated necessities should
always be grounded in logical necessity. The postulated necessary nomic pro-
file is definitely a brute necessity, but if the identity thesis is adopted, then the
relevant necessity follows from the logical property of the necessity of iden-
tity.10 Chalmers, for instance, reproaches certain versions of physicalism
for not explaining their necessity claim. If my argument is right, then the
physicalist necessity is explicable via a priori probabilistic reasoning, while
the dualist response in terms of necessary pyscho-physical laws comes out as
involving brute modal facts.
10 One might ask at this point: what explains the identity itself ? David Papineau ([2002], p. 114)
argues that identity, in general, is in no need of explanation; it does not make good sense to ask,
once we know an identity to hold, why that identity holds. In our context, however, we need not
rely on such a principle. What explains our mind–brain identity is precisely the fact that that
identity itself explains our thesis of necessary correlation between mental and physical proper-
ties. It is not infrequent in science that our commitment to the existence of some x is explained by
the fact that x explains, in the best available way, some y. For example, the commitment to the
existence of the gene is explained by the fact that the gene explains, in the best available way, our
observations about heritability of traits.
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Another way to arrive at the step of identification is not by assuming
naturalism, i.e. the conformity of the actual world with NNP, but by
weighing the two conflicting reasons, the one for naturalism (and against
the conceivability intuition) and the one for the conceivability of an infinity
of physical duplicates with various combinations of phenomenal property
distribution. If the reasons for naturalism are stronger, then we can elim-
inate the anomic scenario and go through the three above-mentioned argu-
ments to the conclusion that the identification of the mental with the
physical is to be preferred. The question is then which of the reasons is
stronger. My argument for the necessity of the actual NNP and against the
conceivability of zombies, qualia inversion, and other combinations of phe-
nomenal property distributions relies on the fact that the reasoning based
on the indifference principle can safely be taken as simply an extension of
the a priori reasoning involved in thoroughly considering the conceivability
of the zombie and other non-NNP scenarios; hence, since the end result of
this a priori reasoning is something that is incompatible with the initial
conceivability intuition, we should discard that intuition. It is only prima
facie conceivable that there be zombies and other non-NNP scenarios. We
may start by applying the indifference principle to our own phenomenal
states (which is directly evidential) with the reference class of actual obser-
vers, and thereby establish that the actual world has to conform, almost
surely, to NNP (see more about this in Section 4). Then we apply the
indifference principle once again, with the actual world taken as a
random sample of the set of all initially conceivable worlds that are physical
duplicates of the actual world but phenomenally different. Then we con-
clude that since otherwise our world conforming to NNP would be a huge
coincidence, it must be the case that it is sure that all physical duplicates of
our world are to be assumed as being mental duplicates as well, which is
equivalent to concluding that our initial conceivability intuition was wrong
and has to be revised in light of the subsequent a priori probabilistic
reasoning.
4 The Technical Formulation of the Argument
Mathematically, given that the conditions for the applicability of the indif-
ference principle are satisfied, the probability of the actual world, @, being in
NNP—p(@nnp)—is given by the fraction ( fnnp) of NNP-worlds (Nnnp) within
the total number of physical duplicates of the actual world (Nnnp + Nnon-nnp):
pð@nnpÞ ¼ fnnp ¼ Nnnp=ðNnnp+NnonnnpÞ
We observe that p(@nnp) approaches unity (i.e. our belief that the actual
world is in NNP is almost certain) when, and only when the difference between
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(Nnnp + Nnon-nnp) and Nnnp approaches zero, that is, when Nnon-nnp is
approximately zero. Accepting that Nnon-nnp is approximately zero is
tantamount to denying either the conceivability premise, or PSYCHO-
EXPLOSION. Since the latter is undeniable by the naturalistic dualist, she
is then forced to choose between p(@nnp) being zero and the denial of the
conceivability premise.11
Now, in the formula above I assumed Nnnp + Nnon-nnp merely to approach
infinity. However, as I pointed out before, we can take, under some assump-
tions, the number of possible phenomenal configurations consistent with
physical duplicates of @ to be countably infinite. In that case, if both
PSYCHO EXPLOSION and the thesis that psycho-physical correlations are
nomological danglers, in Feigl’s sense, are true, then the conceivability of
some non-NNP scenario entails that the actual world being in NNP has prob-
ability zero (assuming a standard infinite probability space), or infinitesimal
(assuming a nonstandard, i.e. hyperreal-valued, probability space). One intui-
tive difference between the standard setting and the nonstandard one is that
the former will allow for possibilities with probability zero, whereas the latter
will reserve probability zero for logical impossibilities only. Hence, nonstan-
dard spaces, based on the hyperreal line, are prima facie more intuitive from
11 We get similar results in a Bayesian framework. Let’s denote by H the hypothesis that there is a
huge number of physical duplicates of @ that differ in phenomenal property distributions, with
E the proposition that @ is in NNP, and with :H the proposition that almost all physical
duplicates of @ are in NNP.
Bayes Rule says: P(H|E) = p(H)p(E|H)/ [p(H)p(E|H) + p(:H)p(E|:H)]. Let us assign some very
high probability to H, say, .99999. By the indifference principle we get a very low probability for
p(E|H), and a very high one, i.e. 1 p(E|H), for p(E|:H). The numerical values for our par-
ameters are as follows:
H: there are infinitely many conceivable phenomenal distributions over physical
duplicates of @
p(H) = .99999
:H: almost all physical duplicates of @ are in NNP
p(:H) = .00001
E: @ is in NNP
p(E|H) = .0000001
p(E|:H) = .9999999
Effecting the replacement in Bayes Rule, we get:
P(H|E) = .99999*.0000001/[.99999*.0000001 + .00001*.9999999]
=9.9999*108/(9.9999*108 + 9.999999*106) = .0099
This means that one should update p(H) from .99999 to .0099. If the number of non-NNP
physical duplicates of @ approaches infinity, then the posterior probability of H is approximately
zero.
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this and other points of view12 (Skyrms [1995]; Vallentyne [2000]; Elga [2004];
Herzberg [2007]; Williamson [2007]).13
However, in both standard and nonstandard settings it will be true that
if the probability of @ being in NNP is strictly positive noninfinitesimal
(i.e. nonzero in standard setting and noninfinitesimal in nonstandard setting),
then the event ‘@ is in NNP’ has to be sure (i.e. ‘@ is in NNP’ is an atom14 of
probability 1 in the sample space) rather than almost sure (i.e. the sample
space has either a union of probability 0 of non-NNP states, or a union of
infinitesimal probability of non-NNP states). This is so because the thesis
of nomological dangling ensures that all the events of the sample space have
to be equiprobable; both the hypothesis of a sample space with a union of
probability 0 of non-NNP states, and one with a union of infinitesimal prob-
ability of non-NNP states would contradict the requirement of equiprobabil-
ity of all events. To say that @ is in NNP surely is, therefore, to say that it is
the only possibility. Hence, whenever one assigns a higher than infinitesimal
probability to NNP being actual, one has to admit that all non-NNP scenarios
are epistemically impossible; hence, the actual world is in NNP surely.
Contraposing, whenever one assumes that any non-NNP scenario is episte-
mically possible, one has to admit that the actual world being in NNP has
probability zero or infinitesimal, so the actual world is not in NNP almost
surely.15
12 For instance, in standard probability theory, because any atom of a countable infinite state
space has measure zero, any subset of the union of such atoms has the same probability as the
union (since they have the same cardinality), assuming uniform probability distribution over the
infinite number of states. Also, any finite union of atoms has the same probability as an infinite
subset of the state space. To take an example for each, if we are to choose a number randomly
from the set of natural numbers, the event ‘the number is a multiple of 2’ and ‘the number is a
multiple of 100’ have the same probability, and the same is true of events ‘the number is between
1 and 1 million’ and ‘the number is a multiple of 3’. Some philosophers find these facts counter-
intuitive (e.g. McCall and Armstrong [1989] and Vallentyne [2000]). Things are different with
nonstandard probability theory, as I exemplify later, in footnote 16.
13 We should note, though, that all these authors except Vallentyne and Herzberg have arguments
that discourage a too optimistic attitude towards nonstandard analysis as a more intuitive basis
for probability theory.
14 An atom of a probability space is a set of strictly positive measure such that any measurable
subset of it has either that measure or measure zero. A probability space with an atom of
probability 1 is called ‘trivial’. A probability space (V, A, P), where V is the sample space, A
is an algebra on V, and P is the probability function, is trivial iff we only have1 and V as events
in it, that is, A= {1, V}, it consists of exactly two sets—the sample space (everything) and the
empty set (nothing).
15 The argument works for a continuous probability space just as well. Assume that the sample
space is the real unit interval and our variable, the phenomenal space, is a continuous random
variable. This means that instead of probabilities as such we will have a probability density
function, whose integral over an interval of possible values will assign a (a nonzero) probability
for the actual world being within that interval. If any non-NNP world is conceivable, then by
PSYCHO-EXPLOSION, continuously many of them are conceivable. Given the thesis of
nomological dangling applied now to phenomenal continua, the indifference principle applies
across all values of the phenomenal variable across physical duplicates of @. Hence, the prob-
ability of @ being within some interval (a, b], such that 0 a< b 1, corresponding to NNP, is
given by the continuous uniform distribution, and will have to be the same as that of @ being in
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Furthermore, if we adopt nonstandard analysis, there is a sense in which the
number of anomic distributions of phenomenal properties across physical
duplicates of the actual world is by far larger than nomic distributions, and
we also get the disturbing result that it is almost certain that we live in a world
with a random distribution of phenomenal properties. Here, I use ‘nomic’ as a
qualifier of a distribution of phenomenal properties over a physical duplicate
W of @ to denote a (contingent) supervenience preserving pattern of physical–
phenomenal coinstantiations (so for each world W, it is a surjection from
the domain of actually instantiated properties to a codomain consisting of
phenomenal property instantiations in W). An ‘anomic’ distribution will be
one that does not have this structure. For instance, a world in which each type
of brain state B is always associated with some particular type of phenomenal
state A is one in which A has a nomic distribution in the above sense, whereas
a world in which B is associated with different types of phenomenal states at
different times or places is one in which the phenomenal distribution is con-
sidered anomic. The claim is that such anomic distributions are by far more
probable than nomic ones, in nonstandard settings.
We don’t know the exact pattern of physical property instantiations of the
actual world, and even if we did it would be too complicated to be used to
exemplify this point. So let us use a toy model of the physical aspect of the
actual world. Let us assume that the actual world exists for two moments of
time, and a brain state B is instantiated both times. Supervenience preserving
combinations of phenomenal property instantiations (i.e. what I have called
‘nomic distributions’) will be sequences of two terms, a1 and a2, such that
a1 = a2. For instance, if we represent the possible phenomenal states as the
set of natural numbers, the nomic distributions in our toy model will be {1,1},
{2,2}, . . .We are interested in the proportion of such distributions within the
set of all possible 2-permutations of the set of phenomenal properties. In
standard probability theory this number would be the same as the total
number of possible 2-permutations, as the two sets have the same cardinality
(that of N). But in nonstandard analysis the ordinary algebraic operations can
be applied to nonstandard infinities (also called ‘unlimited hyperreals’) on the
model of the finite case16. We denote the nonstandard infinite number of
any interval of equal length (measure), i.e. length a – b. If that is the case, then as a – b
approaches zero the probability of @ being in NNP either approaches a value that is statistically
equivalent to zero (in measure-theoretic terms: the property of being non-NNP holds almost
everywhere); or otherwise it is strictly greater than zero, in which case (a, b] =V almost every-
where, which means that the only events in the sample space are NNP and the null set (so the
non-NNP scenarios do not exist as epistemic possibilities at all).
16 The reader might want to consult Jerome Keisler’s ([2000]) introduction to nonstandard analysis
for the properties of algebraic operations having hyperreal numbers as their terms. I note here
only that an infinitesimal (or infinitely small) number is a ", such that –a<"< a, for all positive
real numbers a. The only real number that is infinitesimal is zero. The line of hyperreal numbers
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sequences of the form {a1, a2}, such that a1 = a2, with H. The total number of
sequences, i.e. distributions of phenomenal properties, in our toy model, ob-
tained by applying the formula for n-permutations of a set of x elements with
repetitions,17 is then H + H!/(H 2)!. The proportion of H in this set is (after
applying the rules of division for factorials) H/H2, which is infinitesimal
(Keisler [2000], p. 32). This means that it is infinitely more probable that the
actual world is anomic in the sense of phenomenal property instantiations not
conforming to the requirement of intra-world supervenience.
However, the indifference principle is of help here once more. The principle,
in its most general form, asserts that when there is no a priori reason to
assign more probability to an outcome than to any other outcome, one
should assign equal probabilities (or degrees of belief) to all possible
outcomes. A version of this principle is formulated by appeal to observers
and a reference class. One such version, due to Nick Bostrom ([2002a]) is the
self-sampling assumption:
(SSA) One should reason as if one were a random sample from the set of
all observers in one’s reference class.
As we noted before, Feigl argued that we can infer, probabilistically, from our
own case that our world conforms to NNP. Naturalistic dualists agree, as they
think the alternative would be blanket skepticism about other minds, and the
unacceptable conclusion that even if there are other minds these are randomly
related to physical states. We can argue for such an inference from own case to
NNP being actual by appeal to SSA. What I observe is that I myself do
conform to what NNP would predict an observer should observe. I observe
that my behavior and my brain states always match my phenomenal states.18
is then constructed by positing infinitesimals that are not zero and adding them to the real line. A
positive nonstandard infinite number, H, is then 1/". Standard algebraic operations and rela-
tions can be applied in this setting so that we get: negatives, reciprocals, sums, products, quo-
tients, and roots. To give a few examples, 1/H, "/H, and "/1 are infinitesimals; H/1, H/", and
1/" are infinite (provided that " 6¼ 0); H/K, "/, H", and H + K are indeterminate forms, their
value depending on what H, K, ", and  are. For instance, if " is 1/H, then H"= H/H = 1; if " is
1/H2, then H"= H/H2 =  (an infinitesimal). See (Keisler [2000], Chapter 1).
17 The number of n-permutations of a set of x elements without repetitions is x!/(x n)!, which is
equivalent to the number of injective functions from x to n. Adding x to this number we get the
number of n-permutations of a set with x elements with repetitions.
18 An anonymous referee objects that in order to assert that I observe that my own phenomenal
states match my physical states as prescribed by NNP presupposes perceptual realism, which in
turn depends upon acceptance that the world exemplifies NNP. Also, he/she objects that ‘I have
zero evidence about my brain states and this is true of almost everyone (I know a few people who
have been in MRI experiments etc. but they are very few and far between)’. Regarding the
second objection, what is important is not whether I really have such evidence, but that, in
principle, I can have such evidence. For instance, I can take images via computer tomography of
my brain while having a certain kind of experience, and establish correlations. Regarding the
first objection, to insist on having to solve some metaphysical problems in the philosophy of
perception in order to be justified in asserting that some phenomenal–neural or phenomenal–be-
havioral correlations hold would, in general, and from the point of view of the empirical
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Given this, what is the probability that all other actual observers undergo the
same pattern of psycho-physical correlations? By SSA, I should take myself as
a random sample from the set of actual observers. Given what I observe in my
own case, the set of actual observers has to contain a much larger number of
NNP-conform observers than ones with random phenomenal distributions.
That means that it should be almost certain that the actual world has NNP.
One might ask at this point: What if we considered the set of all conceivable
observers in all physical duplicates of the actual world? Would we have
obtained the same result as previously when considering worlds, namely,
the result that it is almost certain that the actual world does not have NNP?
First, let us note that the answer is no: had we considered all conceivable
observers, the fact that my subjective case does conform to NNP would have
been a huge coincidence, unless most conceivable observers conformed to
NNP. In order for my experiences to be as they actually are, their probability
has to be very high (given that I am one case out of an infinite number of
observers), which means, in light of the indifference principle, that almost all
conceivable observers have to have experiences conforming to NNP.
Second, the reason for choosing as the reference class the class of actual
observers is straightforward: we were interested in whether other people in the
actual world undergo the same experiences correlated with the same brain
states as I do. The reference class had already been selected via the fact that
in my own case I do have direct evidence about the correlations. When, on the
other hand, we inquired about whether the actual world as such conforms to
NNP, we proceeded from ignorance about what probability to assign to each
conceivable world; therefore, it was whole worlds that were rightly considered
as members of the reference class.
Where does all this leave us? We apparently have conflicting results.
By PSYCHO-EXPLOSION, and the first premise of the conceivability argu-
ment, we have reason to believe in an infinity of non-NNP worlds, and hence
method, be to set the bar too high, and even to change the subject in a sense. It would mean to set
the bar too high because if it were right, then asserting any law, including purely physical ones,
would be problematic just because it hasn’t been settled whether perception involves the world
or some intermediary ‘veil’ between us and the world, or just sense data. It would mean to
change the subject because one can take any view about the metaphysics of perception and
accommodate assertions about nomic connections by employing the terminology of that view.
For instance, one can be a phenomenalist (the view that reality is constituted by sense data) and
formulate laws in terms of phenomenal states that present themselves as physical (as being about
physical, chemical, behavioral, etc., facts) and phenomenal states that present themselves as
phenomenal (experiences, qualia). One can be a so-called representative realist (the view that
experience is constituted by sense data, which in turn represent—by correlation or isomopr-
hism—a physical reality that lies beyond the ‘veil of perception’) and formulate laws in terms of
correlations between sets or structures of phenomenal property instantiations and the physical
structures represented by sense data with a physical content. In this article I have used a realist
terminology as that seems the simplest and most intuitive, but nothing hinges on this choice as
far as the main argument is concerned.
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to believe to a very high degree that our world is anomic in terms of
psycho-physical connections. On the other hand, by SSN as applied to our
own experience, which conforms to NNP, we should believe to a very high
degree that our world does conform to NNP. But if it is almost sure that the
actual world has NNP, then, by the first application of the indifference prin-
ciple, it must be sure that it has NNP, which means that physical duplicates of
the actual world with different patterns of phenomenal property distribution
are not possibilities at all, they are inconceivable.
Even this much, however, is already damaging for naturalistic dualism.
On the assumption that PSYCHO-EXPLOSION is indeed very plausible,
we are left with a disjunctive conclusion which excludes, probabilistically,
the view that there are psycho-physical laws that are merely nomological
danglers:
(C) Either it is almost sure that our world is psycho-physically anomic,
or physical duplicates of the actual world with different patterns of
phenomenal property distribution are inconceivable.
To say that these non-NNP scenarios are inconceivable is tantamount to
saying that NNP is epistemically necessary. So the two options we are left
with are: anomic danglers and logically necessary danglers, but not merely
nomological danglers, contrary to the naturalistic dualist doctrine.
Before concluding I would like to consider a few objections. Some of
them are related to the core argument, some to technicalities connected to
probability theory.
5 Objections Related to the Core Argument
Objection 1: The argument aims at establishing ontological conclusions
supposed to be derived from epistemic premises, but one could be skeptical
about whether such inferences, in general, are acceptable.19
In response I would like to point out that we have two groups of arguments:
ones leading to the partial conclusion expressed by disjunction (C) and then to
the assertion of the second disjunct of (C), i.e. that NNP is necessary, and ones
for the plausibility of identity as the relation between mental and physical
properties. Within the first group, the argument for (C) is purely epistemic
with (C) itself being an epistemic claim, or a claim about what it is rational to
believe. Then, the second disjunct of (C), which states that non-NNP scenarios
are inconceivable, entails the ontological conclusion that these scenarios are
impossible, hence another ontological conclusion that physicalism is true.
Virtually everyone in the debate agrees that the move from inconceivability
to impossibility is not problematic; the disagreement is about whether
19 An objection put forward by two anonymous referees.
Istva´n Aranyosi504
conceivability entails possibility. There is no such claim as the latter in my
argument.
As regards the second group of arguments, the ones for the plausibility of
identity, these are, again, based on standardly accepted principles: Hume’s
dictum, the thesis of no brute necessity, and Ockham’s razor.
Therefore, there does not seem to emerge any especially worrying issue
related to the epistemic-ontic inference.
Objection 2: The cross-world application of SSA is dubious, as its type of
conclusion, namely, the necessary truth of the actual nomic profile, would
overgeneralize to cases in which, intuitively, actual facts (laws, constants,
magnitudes, probabilistic correlations) are to be taken as contingent.20
Take, for instance, the fine-structure constant, which characterizes one of the
four fundamental forces, namely, the electromagnetic force, and is respon-
sible, among other things, for our observing a stable chemical structure of the
world. This stability is explained, therefore, by a correlation between atomic
structure and chemical properties. But consider all possible worlds that are
all-law duplicates of the actual world save for the fine structure constant value.
A random observer across all these worlds will not observe the correlation
between atomic and chemical properties. Do we infer that the fine structure
constant necessarily takes on the same value in all the as-defined worlds?
Not at all. The fact that the fine structure constant varies across possible
worlds does not show that it probably varies within the actual world.
There are two independent answers to this problem. The first one stresses
the difference between (i) a case like the one above, involving an established
set of laws based on actual observation and (ii) the case of mental–physical
correlations in the context of Feigl’s point about nomological danglers,
or Chalmers’s equivalent thesis of the explanatory irrelevance of experience.
The difference that is worth stressing here consists of the fact that the issue
of whether there is a nomic relation between the relevant terms in case (i) is
settled by observation. Similarly, any actual physical law is established, or at
least confirmed, by observation. The picture is different with case (ii). Here,
because the thesis of the explanatory irrelevance of phenomenal experience is
assumed (which states, basically, that since experiences are not intersubject-
ively available, whether experience occurs in a subject, other than the
first-person, does not make a difference when it comes to explaining or pre-
dicting the occurrence of intersubjectively available events, e.g. brain states
and behavior), the issue is precisely whether it is legitimate to posit a nomic
relation on the model of the one identifiable in one’s own case (i.e. at the
first-person level). The issue cannot be settled, in other words, by observation,
20 I am grateful to an anonymous referee who has made all the objections that will occur under this
heading.
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because there is no observation having as content the phenomenal states of
others.
In case (i) establishing the nomic connection is independent of consider-
ations about what is conceivable or not—it is simply a matter of what is
observed via standard empirical methods. Because of this independence, it
does not follow from the fact that there is such an observed nomic connection
that it is necessary, i.e. that it is the same in all possible/conceivable worlds.
However, in case (ii) establishing the nomic connection is not independent
of what is conceivable, because we can’t make the relevant third-person
observations. Since all random observers across all possible worlds that are
physically like ours are in the very same situation as we are with respect to
phenomenal experiences from a third-person point of view, the argument goes
through, namely, it establishes as a condition on warrantedly asserting that
NNP is actually exemplified that this nomic profile is exemplified in all pos-
sible worlds. Things would have been different if we had a so-called ‘con-
sciousness meter’.21 Then we would have had both empirical evidence of the
actuality of NNP and a priori evidence of its contingency.
The second answer involves the idea that under certain assumptions
of current, observationally well-grounded theories in cosmology we do in
fact have reason to posit variation within the actual world as a function of
cross-world variations regarding various magnitudes and constants. Both
multiverse theories (according to which there is an indefinite number of par-
allel and causally disconnected universes, ours being one of them), and the
Big Bang theory combined with the hypothesis that our universe is flat, i.e. it
has a Euclidean topology, have the consequence that all possible/conceivable
observations are actually made, sooner or later, with probability 1.22 It is an
interesting question (discussed in Bostrom [2002b]), then, how to make sense
of such a Big World cosmology as having observational consequences at all.
The self-sampling assumption is a principle that can solve this problem.
The idea is that our main datum is not that someone in the universe makes
an observation, but that we make an observation. We have, then, an indiffer-
ence principle with an essential de se component, from which we infer that
whichever theory accommodates this de se datum better is the one with higher
probability. For instance, the Big World hypothesis would have it that with
probability one, sooner or later, an ordinary object such as a human brain will
21 An imaginary device meant to detect conscious experience in others, invented by Chalmers, and
presented, jokingly, in the guise of a hair-dryer by him during the second ‘Toward a Science of
Consciousness’ conference, Tucson, Arizona, April 1996.
22 For instance, if it is possible/conceivable that the above-mentioned fine-structure constant, a,
has a different value than actually, that value would actually be instantiated with some nonzero
probability, which means that it is not a constant after all. It is worth noting that, in fact, John
K. Webb et al. ([1999], [2001]) have found evidence compatible with a slight time-variation of a
with lower value in the past.
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pop out of a black hole, because such phenomena are possible according to the
theory. However, the fact that we do not observe such phenomena reduces
their probability, virtually, to nil.
The reply to our objection could then be that the evaluation of evidence that
disconfirms NNP being actually the case depends on whether such evidence is
possible/conceivable; however, on the hypothesis of there being an
NNP-conforming pattern of mental–physical correlation, assumed by the nat-
uralistic dualist, such evidence should come out as impossible.
There is a further problem, however. SSA solves the problem of the Big
World hypothesis as regards the meaningfulness of observational effects by
being capable of assigning a probability of almost 1 to the theories that con-
form to what we observe. So why can’t the naturalistic dualist assume a weaker
thesis, coupled with the Big World hypothesis, namely, that if, per impossibile,
we could observe other people’s phenomenal experiences, we would observe
NNP-conform correlations all the time. This is a weaker thesis because of the
de se component, we, involved in the statements about observed data, which is
compatible with some ‘freakish observers’ (Bostrom [2002b]) observing phe-
nomena that are contrary to NNP, and which have, because of SSA, a van-
ishingly small probability. With such an approach the naturalistic dualist has a
point in that it looks as though a small probability of observing phenomena
that are contrary to NNP is a fortiori sufficient to falsify physicalism.
The answer to this problem is similar to the one I gave above; whether there
actually are freakish observers is a matter of what is conceivable in this re-
spect. But what is conceivable is not independent of what we (rather than
the alleged freakish observers) observe, and so the verdict of the argument
stands just as before. If, on the other hand, the thesis of nomological dangling
for psycho-physical laws is assumed, then, as shown in the argument, the
non-NNP scenarios will not only have probability zero, but won’t count as
possibilities at all, because if they did, they wouldn’t be equiprobable with the
NNP state, contrary to the indifference principle sanctioned by the thesis
of nomological danglers.
Objection 3: The argument seems to massively overgeneralize to any case of
apparent inductive or abductive knowledge.23
Everyone allows that it is conceivable that the world has the same regularities
in the past but different regularities in the future—and, of course, there are
infinitely many ways that the future could be different. By my reasoning, the
objection goes, we can’t know that the future regularities obtain. But most
people think we can know this. So the argument seems to prove inductive
skepticism. Likewise for abductive skepticism and the like.
23 An objection raised by David Chalmers in correspondence.
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In reply I would like to point out that when it comes to induction there is a
clear disanalogy between the past-to-future generalization and the potential
direct generalization from one’s own experience to psycho-physical laws hold-
ing across all conscious subjects in a world. Induction in general involves
inference to ‘if p, then probably q’ from a large number of observed instanti-
ations of p correlated with q. However, in the case of phenomenal properties
the only case in which such inductive reasoning can proceed is the first-person
case, and, indeed, I have assumed in my argument that there are such laws in
the first-person case, based on observation of regularities of the form ‘p
is always correlated with q’, where ‘p’ stands for neurophysiological properties
and ‘q’ for qualia. Part of the assumption could, of course, be that we can
inductively generalize from past correlations in our own case, because we did
observe the correlations in the past. But in the case of trying to directly gen-
eralize from own case correlations to laws that hold across the board in a
world, we lack the observation of a large number of instantiations of q in a
large number of subjects; given the explanatory irrelevance of experience
(Chalmers), or the fact that psycho-physical laws are nomological danglers
(Feigl), we can never have any acceptable evidential bases for a standard
inductive inference. However, we can derive indirectly that the actual world
has the required laws, namely, by appeal to the indifference principle; and,
indeed, we did derive that the actual world is in NNP. So there is nothing in
my argument to entail skepticism about induction in general. All the argument
shows is that in the mental–physical case, unlike in physical–physical cases, for
instance, there is no direct inductive generalization that is feasible; but this
should not be a surprise, as it just follows from both Feigl’s and Chalmers’
observations about the special properties of qualia in the context of
explanation.
Turning to abduction, or inference to the best explanation, again, I see no
reason to think that the argument is committed to any kind of skepticism, to
say nothing of the fact that part of the argument is actually based on such
reasoning. Abductive reasoning involves the inference to ‘p explains q’ as the
result of p being the best explanation—in terms of simplicity, prior probabil-
ity, and explanatory power—from among the possible explanations of q.
In our case ‘p’ is a replacement for the totality of laws that constitute NNP,
while ‘q’ stands for the psycho-physical correlations observed in my own case.
According to the second part of argument, when we applied the self-sampling
assumption (SSA) the best explanation of q is indeed p, because otherwise the
fact that q holds would be a huge coincidence. This way we eliminated the
‘anomic danglers’ disjunct in proposition (C) as a priori improbable given
(SSA). Then, abductive reasoning occurs once more, namely, when inferring
that identity is a more economical way of explaining the resulting necessary
nomic connections.
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So, all in all, our argument does not imply any generalized skepticism about
either induction or abduction.
Objection 4: The actual world having NNP is provable via ‘fading qualia’
and ‘dancing qualia’ type thought experiments.
Chalmers ([1996], Chapter 5) offers arguments, based on the
above-mentioned thought experiments, for what he calls ‘the principle of
organizational invariance’, which is a law of nature stating that systems
that share the same functional organization will instantiate the same phe-
nomenal property patterns, regardless of neurophysiological (or any other
physical) differences that the systems might be characterized by. In the
fading qualia case, we suppose that our initially rich phenomenal experi-
ence gradually fades until it completely disappears, as a result of our brain
cells being replaced by microchips. The question is whether the functional
organization can stay constant. Chalmers argues that it must change as a
consequence, given that we would observe and report these changes. To
suppose otherwise would be to completely disconnect phenomenal experi-
ence from cognition, a very unnaturalistic scenario. The dancing qualia
thought experiment involves a device that is implanted in one’s brain that
can switch between our natural neurophysiological basis for phenomenal
experience and some alternative artificial basis, and qualia inversion is
supposed to happen as a result of switching to the artificial basis. If the
experience changes ‘before my eyes’, as Chalmers puts it, then it will have
an effect on the functionally defined components of my cognitive system—
I will recognize the change and report it. So there is no change in qualia
without a change in functional organization.
In reply, I would like to point out two things. One is that Chalmers himself
does not take these thought experiments as proving that the actual world is in
state NNP. He explicitly states that:
These arguments from thought experiments are only plausibility argu-
ments, as always, but I think they have considerable force. To maintain
the natural possibility of absent and inverted qualia in the face of these
thought experiments requires accepting some implausible theses
about the nature of conscious experience, and in particular between
consciousness and cognition. Given certain natural assumptions about
this relationship, the invariance principle is established as by far the most
plausible hypothesis. ([1996], pp. 250–1)
In other words, what can be established by these thought experiments is not
that these scenarios can’t actually be the case, but that they are not naturally
possible, given that we know what the actual laws of nature are, or that they are
implausible given that we know which laws of nature are actually plausible.
So these considerations leave our argument intact.
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Second, and more importantly, as has recently been pointed out by Michael
Pelczar ([2008]), Chalmers’ thought experiments do not prove anything more
than that within a single consciousness, across various temporal stages of it,
there can’t be phenomenal changes without functional changes. This has no
effect on the interpersonal case, when two distinct cognitive systems share
their functional organization but they are inverted, or one of them has
faded experiences. It is compatible with all we learn from the intrapersonal
considerations about the fact that I would notice a change in my qualia, that
there could theoretically be another person who has had her phenomenal
experiences faded, as compared to mine, since birth. She would also notice
changes within her own phenomenal field, but that does not change the fact
that, as compared to mine, she has faded experiences. Even my own phenom-
enal experience might very well be faded, even when it is rich enough, with
respect to some other person who, as a matter of fact, always has a much
richer experience without functionally differing from me.
Objection 5: The argument seems to work against some epistemic
arguments against physicalism, viz. the conceivability of zombies and that
of qualia inversion, but when it comes to the knowledge argument it loses its
attractiveness, as it entails that Mary, the superscientist who knows
everything physical about the world but hasn’t ever experienced any color,
would not come to learn anything new when visually experiencing a red
rose for the first time.
The intuitive verdict in Mary’s case is that she indeed learns something new
when first seeing a red rose. If my argument is right, then what it is like to see
red, for instance, is identical to a neurophysiological property, so she should
not learn anything new as she knew all neurophysiological facts before having
the experience of the red rose. However, our overall line of reasoning is not in
conflict with the prima facie intuition that Mary learns something new, just as
in the zombie case our line of thought starts from the supposition of the
conceivability of them and of all the other non-NNP scenarios. What the
argument shows is that the intuition is ultimately wrong, based on a priori
probabilistic considerations. Of course, all this is consistent with the initial
attractiveness of the intuition.
Let us see how exactly our line of reasoning applies to the knowledge
argument. Remember that when we discussed the conceivability argument I
pointed out that we’ve been conditioned to focus on certain rhetorically salient
scenarios, like the zombie world and the inverted qualia world. In the case of
the story of Mary we’ve been conditioned to focus on her coming to know
what it is like to see red when first seeing a red rose. But why exactly red? Why,
that is, do we think that Mary does indeed come to know what it is like to see
red, rather than what it is like to see green, when first seeing a red rose?
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David Lewis ([1990]) formulated, correctly, the knowledge argument via
what he calls ‘phenomenal information’, namely, information containing pos-
sibilities that are left open by Mary’s complete physical knowledge. According
to this formulation, before seeing the red rose, Mary’s complete physical
knowledge leaves open infinitely many phenomenal possibilities about the
world. Seeing the red rose for the first time is equivalent to the elimination
of all these possibilities but one. But, for all we know so far, we are not justified
in thinking that the possibility that is actualized in Mary’s phenomenal field is
phenomenal red. On the contrary, given that phenomenal red is only one such
possibility out of an infinity of phenomenal possibilities that are left open by
Mary’s complete physical knowledge, we should assign a very low probability
to this proposition. However, from my own case, that is, from the fact that I
do experience what it is like to see red when seeing a red rose, together with the
indifference principle, I can probabilistically infer that the actual world is in
NNP, so Mary does experience what it is like to see red when seeing a red rose,
rather than what it is like to see green or any other color. But if this is so, then
almost surely in all possible worlds that are physical duplicates of the actual
one Mary comes to know what it is like to see red, and not any other color,
when seeing the red rose for the first time, otherwise the actual world being in
NNP would be a huge coincidence.
This last proposition is equivalent to the proposition that the relation be-
tween Mary’s brain state when seeing the red rose and what it is like to see red
is epistemically necessary, as we arrived to this proposition by a priori prob-
abilistic reasoning. Since this necessity should not be accepted as brute, we can
posit the relation of identity between Mary’s type of brain state and what it is
like to see red, as that would explain why the correlation holds of necessity.
This means that our initial intuition that Mary does learn something new
when seeing red for the first time is ultimately mistaken, but, of course, as
we proceeded through the steps of our probabilistic argument under the as-
sumption—for the sake of a probabilistic reductio—of phenomenal informa-
tion that is supposed to eliminate possibilities that are left open by physical
knowledge, our line of reasoning is perfectly compatible with the existence of
the intuition that Mary learns something new, but, of course, ultimately in-
compatible with its truth.
The conclusion is as radical as Lewis’s own conclusion, i.e. that there is no
such thing as phenomenal information, or as Daniel Dennett’s ([1991]) reply
to the knowledge argument, according to which Mary simply does not learn
anything new. The difference is that, in my view, neither Lewis nor Dennett
made a good enough case for the conclusion, beyond asserting it. The argu-
ment offered here looks at least to be one good candidate for the a priori
derivation, via plausible probabilistic principles, of this radical conclusion.
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6 Objections Related to Technicalities
Objection 6: The indifference principle is known to lead to inconsistencies.
Indeed, there is a lively discussion about how to formulate indifference
principles so as to avoid inconsistent probability assignments. We can gener-
ate inconsistent probability assignments by coarsening the outcome space.
To take a simple example, consider that all we know is that there are three
buckets and one of them contains a ball, but we can’t see the contents of the
buckets. We are required to assign a probability distribution of the ball being
present in a bucket over the three buckets. The indifference principle tells us
that since there is no reason to prefer one bucket over any other when it comes
to guessing whether the ball is present in them, we should assign equal prob-
ability for each bucket to contain the ball, which is 1/3. So, for instance,
supposing we name the buckets as B1, B2, and B3, the probability of the ball
being in B1 is 1/3. We can now coarsen the outcome space by renaming some
of the outcomes, for instance, as:
Outcome 1: ball is in B1.
Outcome 2: ball is in B2-or-B3.
Since the number of outcomes now is 2, the indifference principle will pre-
scribe a probability of 1/2 for the ball being in B1, which is inconsistent with
the previous assignment. Yet, we used the very same principle of indifference.
As applied to our problem, we could coarsen the space of conceivable
worlds that are physical duplicates of actuality but with different distributions
of phenomenal properties, by renaming them, as follows:
Outcome 1: the actual world is in NNP.
Outcome 2: the actual world is in non-NNP.
Again, since we have two outcomes the indifference principle will sanction a
probability of 1/2 for each, which means that, contrary to what we’ve been
arguing for, we should suspend judgment about whether naturalistic dualism
is true or the disjunction between anomic danglers and necessary danglers.
In reply, one could argue that the notion of a possible world as a maximal
consistent set of propositions is clear enough to exclude disjunctive coarsening
of the outcome space. A phrase like ‘possible world W-or-W *’ does not refer
to a possible world at all if W and W * are themselves maximal consistent sets
of propositions, whereas a disjunction of the form ‘possible world W or pos-
sible world W *’ will always refer to either of the two worlds but never to both
or to some fusion of them.
At the same time, we can also appeal to some consistent restriction of
the indifference principle. Paul Castell ([1998]) offers such a restriction,
which he calls ‘the irrelevance principle’. Instead of considering the number
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of outcomes in the outcome space and assigning equal probability to these, we
consider a physical system, P, and one particular outcome, O, that the system
can be in; after this we assert that that the probability of P being in O is the
same at all times, or that the probability of each duplicate of P being in O,
given some time, is constant. We then repeat the same reasoning with respect
all the other outcomes besides O. The probability of a particular outcome will
be given by the frequency of truth of the proposition stating the outcome
within the set of propositions describing each of the duplicates of the
system, or the system itself at different times.
To exemplify, consider our ‘ball and buckets’ example. The system is
the ball and the bucket, and buckets 1, 2, and 3 are assumed to be duplicates.
The relevant state or outcome is the ball being present in the bucket, which we
will denote by ‘1’ (the state of the ball being absent will be denoted by ‘0’).
We can represent the problem as follows:
A1: system 1 (i.e. B1) is in State 1.
A2: system 2 (i.e. B2) is in State 1.
A3: system 3 (i.e. B3) is in State 1.
What the irrelevance principle sanctions is that propositions A1–A3 are equi-
probable. The particular number is then given by assigning TRUE to a propos-
ition of the form ‘system x, for some x, is in State 1’, and observing the frequency
of truth about the system being State 1 in the set of propositions A1–A3:
TRUE: ‘system 1 (i.e. B1) is in State 1’.
FALSE: ‘system 2 (i.e. B2) is in State 1’.
FALSE: ‘system 3 (i.e. B3) is in State 1’.
That is, according to our problem, whenever one of the systems is in State 1,
the other systems must be in State 0. Hence, we obtain the probabilities 1/3
for State 1 and 2/3 for State 0, for a particular system x. The problem of
inconsistent probability assignments via disjunctive redescription of the out-
come space is solved because our above-mentioned Outcome 2 (i.e. ball is in
B2-or-B3) is not itself a duplicate of our physical system.
Applying this reasoning to our problem, we consider as our physical system
the totality of physical facts of the actual world, call it j, and the relevant
state as NNP. j will have an infinity of duplicates, if the first premise of the
conceivability argument and PSYCHO-EXPLOSION are true, each duplicate
corresponding to a rearrangement of phenomenal properties. Then we can
describe our problem as:
A1: system j1 is in state NNP.
A2: system j2 is in state NNP.
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. . .
An: system jn is in state NNP.
Propositions A1–An will be equiprobable. Further, the probability of the
system being in NNP will always be 1/n, whereas the probability of the
system being in non-NNP will always be (n 1)/n, because assigning
TRUE to A1 renders A2–An all false. A redescription of the form ‘system j1
or j2’ won’t be allowed as it would refer to a system that is not a duplicate
of j, i.e. not a physical duplicate of the actual world.
Finally, since n is a very large number, the probability of the actual world
being in state NNP is virtually zero. Hence, the conclusion that either the
conceivability premise is false, or it is almost sure that we don’t live in a
psycho-physically nomological world.
Objection 7: The indifference principle applies when the physical systems
required for stating the propositions of the outcome space actually exist;
but conceivable worlds do not exist, so the principle is not applicable.
Of course, many times these systems actually exist. For instance, in our ‘ball
and buckets’ example all the buckets exist. Similarly, consider the problem of
assigning a probability to a particular poker card being an Ace of Clubs, when
ignorant about any other fact about the cards. We assign probability 1/52,
and the other 51 cards of the deck exist. But what is important is not whether
or not the physical systems that carry the unactualized states exist, but only
the conceptual possibility of these systems, that is, the existence of an abstract
representation of all these systems. In the card game example, we would
obtain the very same result, had all the other cards been destroyed, except
the one we are presented with. We can even imagine God creating a universe
with only one poker card, with the same results of the application of the
indifference principle. All we need is an abstract representation of the game
of poker as containing 52 cards, the Ace of Clubs being among them.24
24 Sometimes the indifference principle is used as a way to argue for the existence of the physical
systems that support the nonactualized possibilities. The argument for the existence of the
Multiverse is such an example. Here, the variable is whether the universe contains life with
conscious observers. The multiverse theorist argues as follows. Given (a) the fine-tuning of our
universe (i.e. the extreme sensitivity of our variable to the physical magnitudes and constants of
the initial conditions), and (b) the fact that we do live in such a universe, we would be either
completely unsurprised, had our universe been just brutely there, or extremely surprised, had the
magnitudes and constants of this universe been probabilistically ‘selected’, given that the uni-
verse containing conscious observers is one case in a very large number of possible lifeless
universes. But given (a) we should not be completely unsurprised, and given (b) we should
not be extremely surprised either. The only way to find a moderate level of our surprise is,
therefore, to assume the existence of a multitude of universes, most of them characterized by all
the non-actual values of the magnitudes and constants of the initial conditions, and one of them
being our universe. Given all these universes, it is no surprise that one of them contains life, but
it is still somewhat surprising as the frequency of life-containing universes within the multiverse
is extremely low. The interested reader might consult John Leslie’s ([1989]).
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7 Conclusion
We started out with the early mind–brain identity thesis, and after a detour
through the dialectic that followed as regards the mind–body problem, we
reached the same conclusion that Feigl, Smart, and Place argued for, but in a
more roundabout way, taking into account the strongest arguments for nat-
uralistic dualism. Feigl’s notion of a nomological dangler and its implications
helped us build a probabilistic argument against merely nomological danglers,
and opened the way to the final step, that of identifying mental and physical
properties. If the argument is judged to have any attractiveness to it, it should
be treated as a new challenge to dualists.
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